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The proximity of the past in Mauritania 







Cet article évalue le processus d’externalisation des frontières de l’Union européenne (UE) 
en Mauritanie à la lumière de certaines transformations qui eurent lieu pendant la période 
coloniale. Il articule ces deux moments historiques en mettant l’accent sur trois 
transformations socio-spatiales produites sous le colonialisme, et il démontre comment 
elles ont été réaffirmées par l’externalisation des frontières européennes. Il s’agit de la 
délimitation territoriale, la mobilité des personnes, et l’appartenance collective. Cette 
analyse ne sous-estime pas l’agencéité des acteurs étatiques dans le processus 
d’externalisation. En effet, bien que le modèle linéaire de délimitation territoriale soit une 
imposition coloniale, il y a maintenant une convergence d’intérêts autour de son 
renforcement. En outre, pendant sa phase d’après-crise, l’externalisation est marquée par 
le désaccord et la contestation entre l’UE et les acteurs étatiques mauritaniens. Ces 
derniers cherchent à s’approprier les catégories et technologies de l’externalisation à leurs 
propres fins. Finalement, on verra que l’étendue de cette capacité d’action étatique reste 
conditionnée par la transformation coloniale de l’organisation socio-spatiale. 
Taking as its backdrop certain transformations entailed by the colonial encounter, this 
article explores European Union (EU) border externalisation in Mauritania. It draws a 
parallel between these two historical instances by highlighting three socio-spatial changes 
brought about by colonialism, and then illustrating how they have been reaffirmed 
through EU border externalisation. These domains are territorial delimitation, human 
mobility, and collective belonging. Such a perspective does not remove the agency of state 
actors from the externalisation process. Indeed, while the linear model of territorial 
delimitation was a colonial imposition, there is now a convergence of interest around its 
reinforcement. Furthermore, externalisation in its post-crisis phase becomes characterised 
by disagreement and contestation between EU and Mauritanian state actors, as the latter 
appropriate categories and technologies of externalisation for their own purposes. 
Nonetheless, it will be shown that the scope in which this agency is enacted is ultimately 
conditioned by the colonial shift in socio-spatial organisation. 
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Introduction 
Colonial rule in Mauritania problematised and regulated the human mobility that was an 
organic part of nomadic social life in the Sahara. Just over 100 years later, European Union 
(EU) external border policy reframed migration which had previously played an undetect-
ed but structural role in Mauritania as “irregular”, and thus in need of management 
(Bensaâd, 2008; Choplin and Lombard, 2008). This serves as a window into deeper 
parallels between the colonial encounter and the EU border externalisation process in 
Mauritania. In particular, this paper highlights certain approaches to socio-spatial 
organisation whose origins lie in the colonial era, but which have been reaffirmed by the 
externalisation process. I argue that the colonial encounter was the foundational socio-
spatial shift upon which border externalisation builds. In highlighting these colonial 
antecedents, the aim is not to posit a singular cause from which all else has since flowed. 
Rather, it is to point to the primordial conditioning by the colonial encounter. The word 
“antecedent” is thus used to draw out historical parallels with a contemporary phenome-
non, without flattening out all that exists between them. It follows that state actors are 
not mere passive recipients of (neo)colonial dictates. Indeed, they actively partake in and 
uphold socio-spatial arrangements whose origins lie in the colonial encounter. 
This focus on the longue durée is often absent from the literature on EU border external-
isation. The reconfigurations of sovereignty entailed in externalisation policies have been 
highlighted (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014, 2015; Vives, 2017), but without reference to more 
deep-seated historical processes. This is also the case for analyses of asylum and refugee 
law and externalisation (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2012; 
Triandafyllidou, 2014) and ethnographic analyses of the EU border regime on the ground 
(Andersson, 2014). On the other hand, calls have been made to decolonise critical 
migration and border scholarship (Korvensyrja, 2017), by highlighting the agency of third 
country states in navigating the dictates of EU external border policies (El Qadim, 2014; 
Cassarino, 2018; Karadağ, 2019; Stock et al., 2019). Rather than viewing these approaches 
as mutually exclusive, this article follows the observation that “from colonial past to 
current European externalization politics, local partners are far from passive socialisees of 
external dictates” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019: 3). From this point of view, the analytical 
means of discerning the scope of third country agency is achieved through an inquiry into 
the lasting constitutive effects of colonial encounters upon contemporary policies.  
This paper adopts such a line of inquiry by first highlighting three transitions brought 
about under colonialism in the interrelated domains of territorial delimitation, human 
mobility, and racialised belonging. The second section then introduces the border 
externalisation process in Mauritania, before analysing this ongoing process through the 
lens of these three socio-spatial dimensions. To do this I draw upon eleven months of 
fieldwork in Mauritania (from September 2017 to August 2018), during which semi-
structured interviews were carried out with a range of officials working in the domains of 
migration and border management. I also draw upon analysis of the Mauritanian national 
migration strategy document (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2010a). Externalisation 
emerges from this discussion not as a top-down imposition upon docile third country 
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actors, but as a process marked by appropriation and contestation on the part of state 
actors. Crucially, however, this state agency ultimately reaffirms the particular approach 
to socio-spatial organisation introduced by the colonial encounter. 
The colonial encounter  
Before emphasising the pivotal consequences of colonialism, it must be stated that this 
is not simply a rehashing of the worn-out claim that colonial rule imposed “arbitrary” 
borders in Africa. This claim often implies, as a solution, the redrawing of borders so that 
they more accurately enclose “natural” cultural realities (Zeller, 2011: 8), and therefore 
overlooks the artificial nature of all borders (Mamdani, 2005: 4). Furthermore, the colonial 
context represents just one, sometimes fleeting, moment in a much longer history of 
territoriality and boundary formation (Lefevbre, 2015). It is therefore essential to avoid 
inflating this moment out of proportion, in the process depicting the coloniser as the sole 
agent of history (Mezzadra and Rahola, 2006). Indeed, insofar as it was facilitated by local 
intermediaries (Bennoune, 1978: 36), this transformation in Mauritania was a co-
constituted one, as in many other African contexts (Mamdani, 1996). But this fact of co-
constitution does not mitigate the qualitative shift entailed by the colonial encounter 
within the three domains of socio-spatial organisation. As shall be demonstrated, it is not 
the drawing of the border tout court that is of consequence, but rather how this 
introduction of the linear mode of territorial division interacts with the domains of human 
mobility and collective belonging.  
The creation of the border  
The expanse of land comprising the present-day state of Mauritania was given carto-
graphic expression in a plan for colonisation submitted to the French Ministry of Colonies 
in 1898. The plan mapped the territories to be brought under French control, which it 
named “la Mauritanie occidentale” (Coppolani, 1999). Seven years later, a decree issued 
on 25 February 1905 set out the first territorial demarcation of this administrative 
territory. This followed an allegiance to the French on the part of noble families in the 
Trarza region, for whom raids by northern tribes created an interest in alignment with 
France. The decree stipulated the Senegal River to form the dividing line between the 
colonial entities of Senegal and Mauritania, with the city of Saint Louis the designated 
departure point of this territorial delineation (Ould Saad, 2004). 
As colonial conquest proceeded north and east into the Sahara, its logic of linear 
territorial division followed. The present-day line between Mauritania and Mali was 
created by colonial decree on 5 July 1944, significantly expanding the geographical scope 
of the colony of Mauritania into what had hitherto been French Sudanese territory (Antil, 
2004). To the northwest, the question of where to draw the line between what were at 
the time the territories of the Overseas Province of the Spanish Sahara and the northern 
Saharan portion of French West Africa provoked low-level geopolitical contestation 
between these two powers. By 1957, an agreement had been reached which would see 
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the peninsula of Nouadhibou – measuring only around 6 km across – vertically bisected by 
a territorial dividing line.
2
 
This cursory overview suffices to demonstrate that a linear logic of territorial division 
had come to dominate this space. This was a marked departure from the territoriality of 
the “Moorish” Emirates that had governed vast expanses of the area prior to colonisation. 
In a discussion of the legal and fiscal system of the Trarza Emirate, located in the south 
east of present-day Mauritania, Muhammed W. As-Sa’d (1989: 57) observes the inherent 
difficulty in pinning down the geographical extent and delimitation of the Emirate, due to 
a lack of any consistent demarcation of the Emirate’s frontiers. Cheikh S. B. Kamara and 
Olivier Leservoisier offer an insight into the nature of the juxtaposition between the 
territoriality of the Trarza and that introduced under colonial rule:  
While for Moorish tribes, frontiers were open and subject to fluctuations according to 
the state of political relations, the French sought to impose another conception of 




Having been introduced by colonial governance, the linear form of territorial division in 
Mauritania is sustained by contemporary EU border externalisation. The latter of course 
differs in many respects from the original colonial imposition of the border form, but in 
each instance, we see an outward projection from Europe of a particular model of 
territorial organisation. Both furthermore entailed radical re-regulations of pre-existing 
modes of human mobility.  
Colonial regulation of human mobility 
The colonial drawing of linear territorial demarcations immediately posed the problem 
of how to manage populations who crossed these new lines. This problem was particularly 
acute in Mauritania, where the vast majority of the colony’s residing population was 
nomadic. Indeed, in the aforementioned discussion of the Trarza Emirate (Map 1), As-Sa’d 
(1989) attributes the indiscernibility of frontiers to the nomadism of the Emirate’s 
inhabitants. Within these “kinetocracies” (Rossi, 2015), transhumance was a bedrock of 
economic and political governance. But these tendencies were reconfigured by the 
colonial endeavour; through the very act of naming and treating nomadic groups as 
populations related to delineated territories, the coloniser bestowed upon itself the 
mandate of statistically documenting all who resided within its territorial purview. This 
imperative presupposed a degree of spatial stasis on the part of the population.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 This would afford the Spanish access to the Western side and the rich fish resources of its Atlantic coast. 
The French, for their part, were ensured access to the coast from the hinterland zones of Idjill and 
Zouérat, where iron ore extraction operations were getting underway. 
3
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Map 1. The linear territorial borders of the contemporary Mauritanian nation-state 
(https://watchers.news/2011/07/27/worsening-drought-threatens-the-mauritanias-
livestock/). 
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Three efforts to reconcile nomadic livelihoods with colonial bureaucratic imperatives 
can be highlighted. Firstly, tribes and groups that moved to districts beyond those in which 
they had been registered were issued a laissez-passer document (Antil, 2004: 55), which 
allowed movement to be documented and places of residence to be recorded. Infor-
mation contained in this laissez-passer included the chief of the encampment, the names 
of the chiefs of its constituent tents, the number of inhabitants of each tent, and the 
number and type of livestock attached to each tent. A second solution, applied in the 
Gorgol region in the south (Map 1), was the development of agriculture and property 
rights through the establishment of a land registry. The logic was that the incentive for 
individual private property would encourage sedentarisation and thus facilitate registra-
tion of residents of administrative territories (Kamara and Leservoisier, 2000: 191). A 
ministerial decree issued to this end on 24 July 1906 offered individuals the opportunity to 
convert their customary right to a given plot of land into a legal property right. Finally, 
efforts were also made to regulate the flow of people across the Senegal River following 
its conversion into a territorial border. Those who resided on one side of the river and 
cultivated land on the other now found themselves subject to two tax regimes – one 
imposed on residents of the colony of Senegal, and the other on crops cultivated in 
Mauritania (Leservoisier, 1994: 61). To avoid this double taxation, people began migrating 
to the north bank. In order to stymy this flow, the colonial government issued an order on 
10 January 1905 decreeing that those who had not been engaged in agricultural activity 
on the north bank prior to colonisation but who were now crossing the river to work the 
land would be subject to both tax regimes.  
These colonial measures aimed at controlling human mobility prefigure the logic of EU 
border externalisation, insofar as human mobility now represented a problem, whose 
solution lay in its institutionalisation and management. This is not to suggest that some 
form of regulation, or channelling (Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2015), of human mobility was 
not a feature of the precolonial era: mobility had always been channelled by those who 
controlled territory, with access to villages, wells, and oases often being granted upon a 
payment of tribute (Bennoune, 1978: 34). The difference, however, lies in the colonial 
problematisation of human mobility, and the administrative response generated by this 
problematisation. This created a path dependency in the realm of migration policy that 
would prove crucial to the process of border externalisation of a later period. Indeed, the 
waning of colonial rule in West Africa saw the replacement of the colonial laissez-passer 
document with a national identity card in 1946 (Gary-Tounkara, 2009: 13), the latter being 
a key mechanism by which the state could judge movement as legitimate or illegitimate.  
Racialising territorial belonging 
The measures discussed above had consequences beyond their specific administrative 
goals which became most apparent in the long-lasting racialised effects of the implanta-
tion of the border. As French colonial rule in West Africa advanced inland during the latter 
half of the 19th century, the Senegal River came to represent a dividing line between 
“black” colonial subjects and “white Moors” who were yet to be pacified (Ould Saad, 
2004: 94). Colonial knowledge production contributed to this racialisation through the 
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depiction of distinct modes of religious practice in operation on either side of the Senegal 
River: a “black” Islam to the south and a “Moorish” Islam to the north, with the “Moorish” 
variant being viewed as the superior and more authentic of the two (Robinson, 2000: 77). 
According to Abdel W. Ould Cheikh (2004: 115), however, this racialisation of religious 
practice “corresponds more to the exigencies of border construction […] than to 
sociological or doctrinal realities”. Such exigencies can be seen in the 1898 plan for 
colonisation, which was the first time the name “Mauritanie” was used in reference to this 
particular geographical expanse of territory. By naming this territory with reference to its 
Arabo-Berber inhabitants – or so-called “Moors” – the colonial administration endowed its 
racial imaginary with territorial legitimacy.  
To understand what this meant in practice, we can return to the problem of regulating 
cross border migration flows from the southern banks to the north banks of the Senegal 
River Valley. Upon realising that the colonial order of January 1905 had failed to stem the 
migrations flows to the north bank, the administration adopted another approach. In 
December 1905, it was ordered that all “indigènes of the black African race residing in 
Mauritanian territory” would henceforth be subject to the same tax regime as that of 
Senegal (colonial administrator’s report quoted in Leservoisier, 1994: 62). “Black African” 
populations based north of the Senegal River were now deemed tax resident in Senegal, 
despite their physical residence within the territories of Mauritania. This now appeared 
the most efficient means of preventing the outflow of valley residents from Senegal and 
ensuring ongoing surplus extraction. But in effect, a novel link between race and territory 
had been created. The category of “black African” contained within the 1905 decree did 
not distinguish between ethno-linguistic groups living on the Senegal River Valley, such as 
Wolof, Soninké and Fulani. But the legacy of this racial polarisation would particularly 
afflict Mauritanian Fulani who, as Riccardo Ciavolella (2010) has shown, have been long 
marginalised by the Mauritanian state.  
None of this is to say that racial distinctions between “white Moors” and “black Afri-
cans” were created by the colonial encounter. As James Webb (1995) has illustrated, 
Arabo-Berber pastoralists in the 17th century came to distinguish themselves from 
sedentary African farmers in terms of “white” and “black” peoples (Ahmed Salem, 2004: 
17). Indeed, Beydhane, the word designating the “Moor” class in the Mauritanian 
Hassaniya dialect, is derived from the Arabic word Abyadh, meaning “white”. The idea of 
racial distinction between peoples based on geographical location thus precedes the 
colonial era in West Africa. The point here has been to highlight the origins of the 
assumption of a natural congruence between linearly defined territory and a particular 
racialised group. In other words, the pivotal nature of colonialism lies not in the fabrica-
tion of a racial divide, nor the instrumentalisation of an existing one, but in the insertion of 
this divide within an entirely novel territorial form. We now turn to how EU border 
externalisation has interacted with this arrangement. 
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EU border externalisation in Mauritania 
“We’re here to export our system.” This was how a member of the Guardia Civil4 
stationed in Nouadhibou, a port city in northern Mauritania (Map 1), explained their 
mandate (interview with Guardia Civil officer, Nouadhibou, 7 April 2018). While he had 
only recently arrived, the presence of Guardia Civil officers in the city has been a 
permanent feature of the urban landscape since the year 2006, when irregular arrivals on 
the Canary Islands from Nouadhibou dramatically increased (Carrera, 2007: 13). A formal 
request by the Spanish government in May 2006 resulted in the launch of the maiden 
naval mission of Frontex, the European border agency. The objective of Operations Hera I 
and II was the prevention of irregular migration to Spain. In the case of Hera I, this was 
done solely by identifying irregular migrants in the Canary Islands. Hera II, on the other 
hand, shifted the focus offshore, by seeking to dissuade boats from leaving the West 
African coastline. In order to process those detained in Spain and intercepted at sea, 
Spanish authorities converted an old school in Nouadhibou into Mauritania’s first migrant 
detention centre (Amnesty International, 2008: 22). Border externalisation in Mauritania 
was underway.  
This was only the beginning of the project of “exporting the system”, however. Beyond 
its crisis phase, border externalisation in Mauritania has been sustained through the 
publication of a comprehensive national migration strategy (Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania, 2010a). Drawn up by EU technical experts in 2010 and jointly published by the 
EU and the Mauritanian government, the national migration strategy is a perpetuation of 
border externalisation and an expansion of its remit. While it is intended to be “compre-
hensive”, its implementation in practice has been rather uneven. The strategy budgeted 
12,900,000 € for projects, but only half of this has been released (interview with national 
coordinator of migration strategy, Nouakchott, 29 March 2018). This is because funding is 
only released on condition of satisfactory project progress and completion (interview with 
EU technical advisor who worked on the strategy, Nouakchott, 26 March 2018). In what 
follows, I discuss aspects of the strategy that have overcome this sense of inertia through 
the lens of the three domains of socio-spatial organisation that were traced in the first 
section of the paper.  
In framing the discussion in such a fashion, the aim is not to suggest a singular colonial 
cause from which all else flows, but it is to suggest that contemporary policies and 
practices are necessarily conditioned by earlier ones. As we progress through each of 
these three dimensions, the locus of agency moves from the international to the nation-
state level. At the same time, however, the conditions in which this agency is exercised 
will be shown to be those inaugurated by the colonial project. By the end of this narrative, 
the EU will have disappeared completely from the scene, with the Mauritanian state now 
                                                 
4
 The Guardia Civil is a Spanish police agency organised under a military structure. Unlike other police 
bodies, they can be deployed overseas. They are under the authority of the Spanish Ministry of Interior 
when patrolling Spanish territory, and under the Ministry of Defence when deployed overseas (interview 
with Guardia Civil officer, Nouadhibou, 7 April 2018). 
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fully in charge of upholding these conditions. This thus resolves any tension between 
highlighting the ongoing relevance of the colonial shift and acknowledging the agency of 
post-colonial state actors. 
Upgrading border infrastructure 
Perhaps more than any other component of the EU migration strategy, the border 
infrastructure upgrade project has seen significant progress and coordination between 
actors in Mauritania. It emerged from the strategy’s 4th strategic axis5 – “controlling 
migration flows” – and envisioned providing Mauritanian authorities with “the technical 
means necessary for better checks on flows of entries and exits on state territory” (Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania, 2010a: 76). Following the efforts taken against irregular migrants 
attempting to reach the Canary Islands post-2006, the strategy document explains (ibid.), 
the Mauritanian government decreed the creation of 45 new mandatory entry points into 
the country. This would serve to better control entry and exit from state territory through 
the standardisation of data systems. Border externalisation has therefore paved the way 
for an infrastructural and technological fortification of the state’s colonially endowed 
territorial borders.  
A range of intermediary bodies have availed of EU funding to facilitate this endeavour, 
constructing and equipping some border posts from scratch, and revamping others. This 
involves coordination between the EU, which generally provides funds and coordinates 
logistics, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which works on project 
implementation in various pre-selected areas, and individual states such as Germany, 
France, and Japan. Such border management projects are the IOM’s biggest area of 
intervention in Mauritania (interview with former IOM Mauritania head of mission, 
Nouakchott, 28 February 2018). This intervention can involve equipping border posts 
through the installation of the IOM’s Personal Identification and Registration System 
(PIRS), a border management technology designed in-house by the IOM (Frowd, 2014: 10). 
Additionally, the IOM regularly organises border and migration management workshops 
and training for Mauritanian security forces, delivered by international experts (IOM, 
2015). As a result of these efforts, according to one such expert (interview, Nouakchott, 
21 March 2018), Mauritania now has the “most advanced” border management regime in 
West Africa, with 48 exclusive legal entry points into state territory.  
While the asymmetries of the externalisation process are manifest in the border 
infrastructure project, the Mauritanian state has an active interest in it. The government 
has acted as the lead coordinator in the construction of 5 out of 48 new posts. In such 
cases, the coordinating state body has been the Borders and Land Affairs Board (direction 
des Frontières et Affaires foncières) within the Ministry of Interior. This body furthermore 
                                                 
5
 Projects created by the strategy were grouped under four “strategic axes”: 1) the institutional framework 
for managing and measuring migration, 2) migration and development, 3) fundamental rights of migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers, and 4) controlling migration flows. 
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determines the exact location of all border posts, beyond the five for which it acted as 
lead coordinator. This is because state officials have access to the information required to 
proceed with the upgrading of a particular post, such as whether the location hosts an 
electricity network, and whether there is a water source nearby (interview with Director 
of the Borders and Land Affairs Board, Nouakchott, 11 July 2018). In addition, the data 
entered at each post is run through the centralised system of the state police headquar-
ters, the DGSN (direction générale de Sûreté nationale). Far from being an imposition from 
above, then, national and international interests have coalesced around this reinforce-
ment of the colonially inherited linear border form.  
This convergence of interest does not, however, mean that relations have always run 
smoothly. Evoking “the complexities of Mauritanian society”, a former IOM head of 
mission said “things take time here, and you need lots of patience and diplomatic skills 
and liaison skills, basically, in order to get things done” (interview, Nouakchott, 
28 February 2018). For several EU officials, these difficulties are reflective of divergences 
from rule of law and governance norms, with experts on separate occasions referring to 
the Mauritanian state as a “military democracy” (interviews, Nouakchott, with EU 
technical advisor, 11 March 2018, and EU delegation official, 30 March 2018). In the eyes 
of the national coordinator of the strategy, difficulties in relations are a symptom of the 
disparity between the Mauritania government and what he described as “the biggest 
bureaucracy in the world” (interview, Nouakchott, 29 March 2018). Being reprimanded for 
failing to follow procedural protocol is particularly jarring for local civil servants when the 
source of admonishment is French: “Since we are a former colony of France, it is very 
poorly perceived” (ibid.).  
The asymmetric relations enshrined by the colonial encounter are thus not far from the 
minds of many civil servants in Mauritania. At the same time, however, such divergences 
open up windows for state agency to be enacted. Indeed, the task of controlling irregular 
migration necessitates reinforcing certain instruments of state control, which states can 
use to their own benefit. The buy-in of third countries in externalisation’s struggle against 
the irregular migrant thus necessarily opens up a window for third-country state actors. 
We now turn to how this agency was enacted in this case. 
Managing irregular migration 
As the border spectacle (De Genova, 2002) on the Canary Islands faded, the task of 
preventing irregular migration gradually shifted from the international level to the 
Mauritanian state. The nature of this transition is encapsulated in the fate of the migrant 
detention centre constructed by Spain in Nouadhibou. Reports of abuse at the centre 
generated criticism by human rights groups (Amnesty International, 2008: 22; Association 
malienne des expulsés et al., 2008: 26), and European Parliamentary delegation missions 
(Panzeri, 2010: 11). The migration strategy document acknowledges these concerns, 
calling for dialogue so that “a consensual solution can be put in place concerning the 
detention centre in Nouadhibou” (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2010a: 76). At the same 
time, it criticises Mauritania’s legal framework for managing migration, noting that “the 
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deterrent aspect of this framework is lacking” (ibid.: 19), and laments the “existing 
statistical production apparatus, which is totally deficient” (ibid.: 56). The ideal solution 
would thus better regulate and deter irregular migrants in Mauritania, while aiding in the 
production of statistical knowledge.  
Just such a solution would emerge in 2012, a year in which the Nouadhibou detention 
centre was closed, and a new biometric residence permit was introduced for foreign 
nationals in Mauritania. The residence permit was brought into administrative effect on 
13 May 2012 through a circular issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs to diplomatic 
agencies, international bodies, and community associations (Boulama et al., 2017: 17). It 
explained that the new residence permit fell within the framework of “controlling and 
managing migration flows” (Cridem, 2012), thereby sustaining the discourse of externali-
sation. At the same time, however, the state became the primary author of this aspect of 
externalisation, a role it adopted by imposing a 30,000 UM (75 €) registration fee and 
cumbersome list of documentation upon those hoping to obtain a permit. 
Migrant community associations soon protested these conditions. On 9 September 
2012, the Ministry of Interior announced that grievances had been heard; the fee would 
be lifted and documentation would now consist solely of a valid national identity card 
(Alakhbar, 2012). Migrant communities were told they had until 15 October to register for 
a permit, which would moreover be issued within 72 hours. Applications subsequently 
skyrocketed, but no permits were delivered after the 72-hour timeframe. Finally, on 
13 January 2013, community representatives were told that the residence permits were 
now available to collect, but only upon payment of the original fee of 30,000 UM. When 
confronted with this change in promises, the governor of Nouakchott responded that the 
previous declaration that the permit was free was an “error in communication” (Alakhbar, 
2013). Many within the migrant community now found themselves in the peculiar position 
of being statistically documented by the state while remaining physically undocumented 
themselves.  
The outcome of this state manoeuvring was an effective illegalisation of the residing 
foreign population, embedding “deportability” (De Genova, 2002) within the country’s 
major urban centres. In the months following the January consultation, patrols and raids 
in African neighbourhoods and workplaces became a regular occurrence. Local media 
reported people being arrested outside of restaurants, in migrant majority neighbour-
hoods and at informal labour pick-up points (Thiam, 2016). A Malian community 
representative indicated: “As soon as they saw a group, they rounded everyone up! They 
don’t ask you anything, they round you up and take you to the commissariat” (interview, 
Nouakchott, 13 December 2017).  
EU bordering interests have a perfectly coherent, if not directly causal, relationship to 
these developments. By enticing people to apply for a residence permit, the state 
acquired a numerical approximation of the number of foreign nationals residing in 
Mauritania, thereby addressing the statistical deficiencies identified in the strategy. And in 
framing the subsequent raids and deportations in terms of “controlling irregular 
migration”, the deterrent aspect of the framework for managing migration could be said 
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to have been strengthened, as per the strategy’s recommendations. At the same time, 
however, the speed and ease with which a campaign of deporting dark-skinned foreigners 
took hold suggest pre-existing racialised tropes aided this element of the strategy. Indeed, 
the biometric residence permit for foreign nationals was part of a broader state-led 
process, one that simultaneously revived racialised territorial exclusions and strained 
relations with EU agents of externalisation.  
The biometric renewal of racialised belonging 
The biometric residence permit for foreign nationals was introduced within the frame-
work of a broader overhaul of the country’s civil registry system. This overhaul was 
instigated on 27 June 2010, with the creation by decree of a new national civil registry 
body, the Agence nationale pour le registre des populations et titres sécurisés (ANRPTS). 
Unlike the analogue system it replaced, the ANRPTS uses biometric technology for the 
purposes of “registering and updating identification data of citizens and foreign nationals 
residing in or in transit through Mauritania” (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2010b). This 
remit necessarily inserts the ANRPTS within the domain of migration control. Indeed, in 
the words of a member of the ANRPTS public relations team, “with the database we have 
been able to assist the state in managing migration flows” (interview, Nouakchott, 
2 August 2018).  
While the ANRPTS thus fits within the logic of externalisation, it also strained relations 
between actors invested in this process. An EU official who worked on the border 
infrastructure project described difficulties that emerged between the agency and the EU 
(interview, Nouakchott, 21 March 2018). He argued the ANRPTS had simply taken the 
entry-exit database that an international team of experts had been working on for the 
border infrastructure project and used it without prior agreement for its own national 
documentation purposes.
6
 This national appropriation of an externally created database 
resulted in a temporary suspension of cooperation with the Mauritanian government in 
the equipping of border posts. In the words of the same official:  
We continue to construct border posts, but we don’t equip them with software or 
materials or anything. Because this agency says it’s going take responsibility, take it! 
And us, we’re not going to help. (ibid.) 
By using a ready-made database for national purposes without prior agreement, the 
ANRPTS strained the border infrastructure project, and thus contested the uneven 
relations of externalisation. 
The ANRPTS provoked controversy amongst others as well. As noted, the biometric 
residence permit rendered many within the foreign national community “deportable”. But 
within this particular postcolonial context, the parameters of biometric citizenship (Ajana, 
2012) do not align precisely with those of national belonging. The civil registry centres at 
                                                 
6
 As well as residence permits for foreign nationals, the ANRPTS issues such documents as birth, death, 
and marriage certificates, as well as passports. 
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which migrant communities gathered in 2012 were also sites of fierce contestation over 
what it means to be Mauritanian. Allegations of discriminatory practices at the centres 
became commonplace, with claims that those of Afro-Mauritanian background were being 
singled out as not entitled to national documentation (Antil and Lesourd, 2012). A 
campaign group called Touche pas à ma nationalité (Hands Off My Nationality) articulated 
these grievances, leading demonstrations which often resulted in violent police dispersals. 
It held that the biometric system was the latest in a long line of racist attempts to exclude 
Afro-Mauritanian groups from the national framework of belonging. Phrases such as 
“administrative deportation” (Jeune Afrique, 2011) and “biometric genocide” (Dia, 2015) 
voice this sentiment.  
Insofar as they evoke a sense of racialised territorial exclusion, such phrases also have a 
deeper historical meaning. Indeed, they consciously refer back to “the events” of 1989, a 
period of racialised violence within and between Mauritania and Senegal (Fresia, 2009; 
Ciavolella, 2010). Over the course of the violence, approximately 95,000 black Africans 
were deported to Senegal. While most were Senegalese nationals, up to 25,000 Afro-
Mauritanians were also expelled. The charge that Afro-Mauritanians were actually 
Senegalese nationals served as a widespread pretext for deportations during “the events”. 
And it has resurfaced with the ANRPTS and the discriminatory practices at its civil registry 
centres. 
While by no means dismissing the factors that immediately preceded “the events” of 
1989, this analysis has been concerned with the primordial conditions that make pushing 
members of a racialised group beyond the linearly demarcated territory of the state 
thinkable.
7
 And in this regard, the colonial conversion of the Senegal River into a racialised 
territorial border between the colonies of Senegal and Mauritania ought to be taken into 
consideration. In the words of the president of a Mauritanian charity (interview, 
Nouakchott, 7 March 2018) whose family was deported during “the events”:   
You know, it was colonisation that made it that way – you know, a river shouldn’t be a 
border! That’s why all along the river you see the same families.   
As mentioned above, what is new here is not the invention of racial groups; the 
Beydhani imaginary had long positioned itself in opposition to other darker skinned 
Africans before the coloniser arrived on the scene. What is unprecedented is the 
assumption of an immutable association between a linearly demarcated expanse of 
territory and these pre-existing racialised groups. Only with this confluence can the 
deportation of those deemed not to belong become conceivable, be they “illegal” 
migrants or Afro-Mauritanian citizens.  
                                                 
7
 Thinkable, not operable. As far as the latter is concerned, the colonial encounter has less explanatory 
value, and the racist machinations of the post-colonial state become more salient. 
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Conclusion 
This article has highlighted parallels between the colonial encounter and the process of 
EU border externalisation in Mauritania. It has done so by discussing three dimensions of 
socio-spatial organisation – territorial delimitation, regulation of human mobility, and 
racialised belonging – which can be discerned in both instances. The transformations 
during the colonial era within each of these domains amount to a qualitative shift in socio-
spatial organisation. The more recent EU border externalisation process has drawn upon 
this shift and reaffirmed each of its constituent dimensions. This does not render state 
actors passive recipients of EU border prerogatives. On the contrary, border externalisa-
tion is characterised by appropriation and contestation on the part of the state. And at a 
more fundamental level, the very task of preventing irregular migration necessarily 
involves empowering instruments for state control. Ultimately, however, the racist 
parameters in which this state agency is enacted continue to be inscribed in antecedents 
laid by the colonial encounter.  
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